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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper explores the relationship between violence and displacement during civil war 
focusing on two different forms of population movements (i.e. incoming and outgoing), and 
two different forms of violence (i.e. direct and indirect). The paper explores the relationship 
between displacement and violence at the local level in the context of a civil war fought 
conventionally using a novel dataset with fine-grained municipal level data from the region 
of Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). First, the evidence indicates that, in 
a civil war context, refugee flows and violence are interrelated in multiple ways: the arrival 
of internal refugees in a locality promotes the perpetration of direct violence against 
civilians; this, in turn, triggers the departure of people from the locality when the other 
group approaches. Second, the paper suggests that exogenous and endogenous to the war 
factors combine to generate patterns of resettlement. Prewar political alignments show to be 
a significant factor accounting for incoming and outgoing flows at the local level; the latter 
indicates that displacement can be used to cleanse the territory from political enemies. In 
addition, wartime variables such as bombings or executions are also significant to explain 
refugee flows. Finally, the Spanish case suggests that the demographic changes provoked by 
displacement, combined with the lethality of the conflict, are likely to have long-term 
political consequences. 
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Introduction: Violence and Displacement during Civil War 
 
How does violence interact with forced and voluntary displacement at the local level during 
civil war? Displacement is a form of violence that can be used either a substitute or a 
complement of lethal violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Esteban, Morelli & Rohner, 2010). At the 
same time, displacement is a crucial variable to be taken into account when analyzing the 
determinants of violence in conflict, as well as its consequences: violence engenders 
displacement, and different forms of violence result from displacement (Hovil, 2008). 
Cycles of violence and displacement are difficult to bring to an end, and they are at the core 
of the humanitarian catastrophes in some of the most severe civil wars in recent times (e.g. 
Great Lakes; former Yugoslavia; Colombia). Despite cycles of violence and displacement 
are not new phenomena, and they have characterized civil wars for decades now, they are 
understudied in the literature. ‘Despite conspicuous awareness of instances in which 
relocation processes have a clear role in the dynamics of violence, there has been no 
systematic research on the way such interaction unfolds’ (Serrano, 2010). 
 
In this paper, I explore empirically the relationship between displacement and violence in 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). It is estimated that over 440,000 people left Spain 
during the conflict and right after its end (Rubio, 1977). The phenomenon of mass 
displacement in this conflict called the attention of international powers, and it directly 
affected countries such as France, which received the vast majority of refugees in an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis in its Southern territories. It has been argued that armed 
groups fighting this conflict deliberately promoted displacement in order to cleanse the 
territory (Prada, 2010).  
 
I study two different aspects of displacement in the Spanish Civil War: i) Incoming refugee 
flows. There were a lot of internally displaced in this conflict, and several localities in 
rearguard territories (such as the region of Catalonia) hosted refugees coming from other 
parts of Spain. I ask the question of where did these internal refugees go; that is, why did 
they go to some localities, and not to others? ii) Outgoing refugee flows. During and after 
the conflict, many people left their localities to go to other localities in Spain, to France or to 
other countries. I explore variation in these outgoing flows: why people fled from some 
localities, and not others? The first question has to do mostly (although not only) with 
‘pulling’ type of factors (what did attract people into a locality?), while the second has to do 
mostly with ‘pushing’ type of factors (what did push people out from a locality?). I will 
analyze data on incoming and outgoing flows at the locality level, and I will explore their 
connections with a number of political and military variables. In particular, I will explore the 
relationship between displacement and two different forms of violence featured in 
conventional civil wars: direct and indirect. I will consider as ‘direct’ violence perpetrated 
with light weaponry (e.g. guns, knives, shotguns, machetes) in a face-to-face type of 
interaction (e.g. individual or mass executions); and as ‘indirect’ violence that is perpetrated 
with heavy weaponry (e.g. tanks, fighter planes) and that does not require a face-to-face 
interaction with the victims (Balcells, 2010a). These types of violence are likely to be 
differently connected to demographic movements and resettlement patterns during conflict. 
 
In this paper, I will take advantage of a fine-grained novel dataset of 1,062 localities in the 
territory of Catalonia, which is an extension of the Balcells (2011a) dataset. This dataset 
contains information at the municipal level on direct violence (i.e. executions), indirect 
violence (i.e. bombings), incoming people in localities (during the civil war: between 1936 
and 1939), and outgoing people from localities, during and after the end of the war.2 In 
addition, it also includes information on a number of demographic, geographic, and political 
covariates. The dataset allows me to inductively explore different hypotheses on the way 
violence and displacement are intertwined.  
 
The Spanish Civil War in Catalonia 
 
The Spanish Civil War (hereafter, also SCW) began as a military coup against a legally 
constituted democratic government. It lasted for almost three years (18 July 1936-1 April 
                                                 
2 The unit of analysis will be the municipality, which is a significant administrative unit in Spain; the local 
level is the one where the most important interactions and dynamics take place during internal conflict 
(Kalyvas, 2006; Fuji, 2009). 
1939) and generated around 800,000 deaths.3 The civil war took place between two main 
political blocs: 1) the army of the Republican government or Loyalists, which also included 
militias of political parties, trade unions, and the International Brigades; I include all of 
them under the label of the ‘left’, even though there were important differences between 
them, including intense rivalries that eventually led to violent clashes; 2) the army of the 
rebels (Francoists or Nationalists), which also included factions of the regular army and 
various militias; I include them all under the label of the ‘right’. The right won the war, and 
Spain became a military dictatorship led by General Francisco Franco that lasted until 1975, 
when Franco died and a transition to democracy began.4 
 
In Spain, violence was perpetrated by both blocs, both in the battlefield and outside of it:  
 
i)  Leftist violence, which has been labeled as ‘Red Terror’, consisted on ‘organized mass 
executions in most parts of the Republican zone (…)’ (Payne, 2004:117), as well as non-
mass executions. This violence has been considered by some historians as very ‘rational’ 
(Ledesma, 2003: 253) because it was very often selective and intended to ‘clean the society’ 
from counterrevolutionary people: religious people, capitalists, landowners, etc. Other 
authors have argued, in contrast, that this violence was mostly a consequence of the collapse 
of the state, which allowed a lot of uncontrolled civilian militias to take weapons and 
perpetrate the crimes (Preston, 1986; Vilar, 1986).5 Leftist violence had approximately 
50,000 victims.6 Members of the clergy constituted a big share of these victims; a total of 
6,832 were assassinated (Rodrigo, 2008: 99). In addition, there was violence within the 
Republican Army (e.g. against deserters), as well as violence between leftist parties (e.g. 
                                                 
3 Data on total deaths during the civil war is still incomplete, and historians are involved in debates about 
estimations (Salas, 1977; Martín Rubio, 1997; Preston, 1986; Torres, 2002; Juliá, 2004; Prada, 2010).  Hence, 
we should take this as an orientation number.  
4 The SCW has an extensive bibliography: it was a key event of the ‘interwar period’, and it had many 
consequences for the international system (i.e. it was the place where the Nazis and the Italian fascists tested 
their aerial military equipment and got ready for WWII). In this paper, I deal only with internal aspects of the 
war: I refer mainly to dynamics of lethal violence and displacement during the conflict. Thus, I leave other 
aspects of it (such as its international dimension) aside. 
5 Ledesma argues against this perspective saying that most of the perpetrators (militia members, civilians) were 
associated with antifascist organizations and local committees or ‘column’ committees and that they cannot be 
considered ‘uncontrolled’. Recent systematic empirical evidence also challenges this claim (Balcells, 2011a). 
6 Only in the territory of Catalonia, it implied the assassination of 8,352 people (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 
1989:450). 
during the ‘events of May’ of May 1937 in Barcelona, between CNT and POUM and the 
Communist Party).7 The Republican army also perpetrated indirect violence in Nationalist 
territories, mainly in frontlines areas but also on rearguard territories inhabited by civilians. 
 
ii) Rightist violence, which was also called ‘blue terror’ (Salomón & Ledesma, 2006), took 
the form of indirect and direct violence. On the one hand, many historians consider it more 
terrorizing than the ‘red terror’ precisely because the machinery that promoted it was very 
well organized (Preston, 1986); a strong discipline and rank-and-file control within the 
Francoist army implied that opportunistic behavior could hardly take place (Prada, 2010). In 
those villages that the Right took control of, executions affected selectively people that were 
suspected to be leftist, leftist militants, liberals, and even Catalan/Basque nationalists. On 
the other hand, the Francoist army was also responsible of mass killings in conquered places 
(i.e. Badajoz), and aerial bombings against civilians.8Francoist violence lasted several years 
after the end of the war; postwar repression was extremely severe: in Catalonia, with a 
population of around 3 million habitants, there were 110,000 judiciary trials, and around 
180,000 people were processed during the whole Francoist period (Solé i Sabaté, 2000). The 
‘state of war’ lasted at least until 1948. 
 
Violence in Catalonia 
 
Catalonia is located in the Northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is delimitated by the 
Mediterranean Sea in the East, by France and Andorra in the North, and by the Spanish 
region of Aragon in the West. The Pyrenees are the natural boundary between Catalonia and 
France. During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was the one created along the 
Ebro River, which divided Aragon into two sides (i.e. Nationalist and Republican). As the 
Nationalist army advanced in 1938, it conquered Lleida and some parts of the Western 
counties, which constituted ‘combat zone’ for a while. One of the most affected counties 
was Terra Alta (in the Southwest of the region), which was witness to the largest battle of 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, this intra-leftist violence was not substantially as important as one would think judging from 
some historical accounts (e.g. Orwell, 1938) –in Catalonia, for example, it only represented 2.85% of the total 
executions (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1989). 
8 The latter were supported by the armed forces of Italy and Germany, allies of Franco in the war. 
 
the war (the ‘battle of the Ebro’, July- December 1938), and the counties of the Midwest 
(PallarsJussà, Segrià, Noguera, Alta Ribagorça), which were affected by the so-called 
‘battle of the Segre’ (April-December 1938). Catalonia was under Republican control during 
most of the war, and it was conquered by the Nationalist army in an offensive that started 
right after the Nationalist victory in the battle of the Ebro (Reverte, 2003; 
SoleiSabaté&Villarroya, 1987).The use of aerial attacks combined with well-organized land 
forces made it a ferocious occupation, leading to the surrender of this territory on 13 
February 1939. 
 
Direct violence took place in Catalonia in two stages: first (from July 1936 to 1938/39) 
violence was perpetrated by leftist militias and the Republican army; later (during and after 
its occupation of the territories) violence was perpetrated by the Nationalist army and right-
wing militias. Indirect violence took place in the form of aerial bombings by the Nationalists 
until they occupied the region. The peak of leftist violence in Catalonia was August 1936; 
after November 1936, it decreased quite abruptly, only slightly increasing again in 1938 and 
in the first two months of 1939, right before the occupation of the region by the Francoist 
army, illustrating the death throes of Republican control of the area. The highest levels of 
rightist repression took place in those months that preceded and immediately followed the 
end of the war (1 April 1939), and it decreased thereafter. Bombings by the Nationalists (and 
their allies) took place during the whole 1936-1939 period, although they increased in 
intensity as the war advanced (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1986). 
 
Displacement in Catalonia 
 
As we said, the SCW was the first contemporary civil war experiencing large numbers of 
internally and externally displaced. Despite the relevance of the phenomenon, data on 
displaced is still very fragmentary; most studies on refugees are limited to one county or to 
one municipality. Partly as a consequence of datascarcity, no systematic study of the 
determinants of displacement has been made to date. 
 
 
Incoming people  
 
During the civil war, Catalonia received a large amount of refugees coming from other 
regions of Spain, which had already been conquered by the Nationalists (i.e. Andalusia, 
Basque Country). The number of internally displaced (thereafter, also IDPs) increased as the 
war advanced, and this implied a lot of challenges for the already scarce Catalan war 
economy (Borràs, 2000; Maymí Rich, et al., 2006; Serrallonga, 2004). According to 
Serrallonga (2004), the total number of IDPs in Catalonia was 300,000 by the end of 1936, 
700,000 by 1937, and more than a million by the end of 1938.9Most of these IDPs left the 
country between the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939 –prior to Franco’s victory- and 
thus became externally displaced. Only a small share of them stayed in their host towns and 
villages. Figures 1-3 display the distribution of IDPs, in % of the population of the host 
localities, for years 1936, 1937, and 1938. The figures depict that IDPs moved towards 
northern areas as the Nationalists were advancing; the figures also show that while some 
areas had IDPs all three years, others did not have IDPs any time during the entire conflict; 
this variation is interesting and shall  be explored.  
 
------------------- 
Figures 1 to 3 about here 
------------------- 
 
Outgoing people 
 
In Catalonia, there were two main phases of people leaving their localities during the civil 
war:  
1) Between 1936 and 1939, Catalonia experienced an outflow of people that left the region 
mostly to go to foreign countries, fleeing from repression by anarchist and communist 
militias. Also, another (smaller) share of people departed to get into other Spanish regions 
that were under rightist control –sometimes to join the Nationalist army. This is the so called 
                                                 
9 These are extremely high figures of internal refugees, larger than some contemporary cases that have been 
considered humanitarian catastrophes: e.g. Azerbaijan, Colombia, Bosnia, or Sierra Leone (ACNUR). 
1936 Exile, which affected people identified with right-wing political parties, landlords and 
members of the bourgeoisie, members of the clergy, and even people identified with left-
wing moderate political partieswho  were threatened by the anarchists and/or communists. 
In this period, the democratic government of the Second Republic was involved with the 
organization of infrastructures that would allow people to flee (Dòll-Petit, 2003). This exile 
has been very well studied from the point of view of the political elites that experienced it, 
and it also has been studied from the perspective of the destinations (i.e. Genoa, which was 
the main destination of this first wave of refugees). Whereas some data has been gathered 
from the perspective of the localities from which these people were leaving, this is not very 
systematic.  
 
2) The so-called 1939 Exile, which affected people that were identified as members of leftist 
political parties, trade unions, Catalan nationalist political parties, and IDPs having arrived 
to Catalonia during the war. This exile has been quite studied by local historians,10 but fine-
grained data has only been collected for a few of them.11 Much of the research on the 1939 
exile is done with a focus on the impact of the refugees in their destination countries 
(France, Mexico, US, Cuba, etc.), on the compilation of global numbers of refugees, or on 
the detailed account of the biographies of important people that went through it, especially 
political leaders (e.g. Lluís Companys, Josep Irla) and intellectuals (e.g. Antonio Machado, 
Pere Quart). The lion’s share of the displaced between 1938 and 1939 in Catalonia became 
external refugees; the preemptive flight from the conquest of Catalonia by the Nationalists 
implied that thousands of hundreds of people crossed the Spain-France border by all 
possible means of transportation. A large number of these refugees died on their way to 
France either because of bad weather, fatigue, famine, or because of the bombs that the 
rightist army threw on them (Sole i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1986, 2003b). There is still not 
accurate data on the rates of return to Spain, but there is quite a lot of evidence that a lot of 
these external refugees could not return until the late 40s/early 50s –due to Franco’s political 
repression - and that many of them never did it because they stayed in their host countries, 
                                                 
10 For example, Pijiula (2000), Gaitx (2007), Planes (1989). 
11 For instance, Gaitx (2007) presents reliable data on exiled people for a total of 48 municipalities.  
they died in French refugee camps, they died during WWII (fighting with the Allies), or they 
were killed in Nazi camps (Roig,1977; Bermejo & Checa, 2006). 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
In this paper, the study of Catalonia will be focused on two different dependent variables at 
the local level: 1) incoming people (i.e. internally displaced people coming into Catalan 
localities); 2) outgoing people (i.e. people leaving from Catalan localities). On the one hand, 
I will explore the determinants of IDPs settlement, namely why they went to some locations 
and not others. In Republican Spain, the government took charge of the settlement of IDPs 
arriving from other Republican areas, and of the provision of services for these people in the 
localities where they were going (Serrallonga, 2004).12 Yet, the government could not fully 
control these population movements, and people very often ended up choosing their own 
destinations; this was especially the case in late stages of the conflict (i.e. 1938). We can 
think that some localities were more receptive to IDPs than others, and that individuals 
made their choices according to this. We can hence ask what made some localities more 
receptive to IDPs than others.  
 
The variables that I will explore are: a) Political variables, related to the prewar period (e.g. 
support for the left in the 1936 elections; political competition), and thus exogenous to the 
war. Following Steele (2009), we could think that leftist supporters having departed from 
Nationalist areas would be more interested in going to places with a greater proportion of 
leftist militants and/or supporters, so that they could become more invisible if facing a threat 
by the Nationalist army. Following Balcells (2011a), we could think that local prewar 
competition —a good predictor for executions‒ would be a deterrent for IDPs, who would 
be reluctant to settle in potentially violent locations. b) Endogenous to the war variables, or 
security variables (e.g. executions, bombings). These variables will be considered lagged: 
we could think that past violence in a locality would be a deterrent for IDPs. 
 
                                                 
12 At the National level, the organization in charge was the Junta Nacional de Refugiados. Yet, until May 1937 
(when the Spanish Republican government is moved to Barcelona), in Catalonia, the regional government and 
the local councils were in charge of the provision of services concerning the refugees.  
After analyzing the determinants of IPDs settlement, I will explore the implications of their 
presence in the localities. Did they have any impact on the perpetration of violence? In a 
context where armed groups are targeting civilians with the intention to cleanse rearguard 
areas of strong enemies (Balcells, 2010a, 2011a), we would think that the group will have an 
interest in eliminating strong supporters of the enemy regardless of their place of origin. 
Areas hosting internally displaced people that are associated with the rival group, B (e.g. 
civilians who are fleeing from areas that are occupied by A), could be more targeted by A 
because of this. Indeed, Steele (2008) has observed, in the civil war in Colombia (1998-
2006), that massacres by the paramilitary were more likely in locations with a greater 
density of internally displaced having fled from paramilitary control zones. From an 
empirical perspective, in Catalonia it is less plausible to observe patterns of prosecution of 
IDPs by means of direct violence (e.g. massacres) because, as explained above, most of 
these IDPs left their host towns when the Francoist army was approaching the territory 
(Pujol, 2006). Yet, IDPs could also have had an impact on direct violence: it could be that 
these leftists coming from other areas of Spain, fleeing from the Nationalists, were prone to 
promote violence against right-wingers in the hosting localities. In Extremadura, for 
example, Espinosa argues that people victimized by fascist repression in the western zone 
(i.e. Almendralejo, Fuente de Maestre, Mérida, Badajoz) were those that led the repression 
in the eastern part; the refugees that went to the Republican zones of Extremadura (fleeing 
from the Nationalists) ‘wanted to kill rightist detainees’ (Espinosa, 2003: 253). Thus, one 
implication of the presence of IDPs in Catalan localities could be a greater number of 
executions by the left during the 1936-1939 period, as compared to localities not hosting 
IDPs. Also, it could be that places hosting IDPs were more targeted by the Nationalists 
through bombings. In Spain, some historians have pointed out that places with larger 
numbers of IDPs were more intensively affected by bombings of the right (e.g. Guernica, as 
argued by Vidal 1997). Yet, there is no systematic evidence in support of this hypothesis 
(Balcells, 2011b). 
 
On the other hand, I will study outgoing population movements, namely people that left 
Catalan localities during and after the end of the war. As explained, in the case of Catalonia, 
due to the proximity with the sea and with France, a vast majority of people that left their 
homes ended up being an external refugee. While I have been able to collect some data at 
the local level on the 1936 exile, I will use an estimate of local level displacement of 1939 
(see below) to study variation across localities. In the empirical analysis, I will focus on the 
so-called 1939 exile, which was numerically more important than the 1936 exile (Dòll-Petit, 
2003). I will again consider both prewar political variables and wartime factors (such as 
executions and bombings), in order to account for this variation. This will allow me to test 
whether the threat of prosecution (leading to displacement) is related to prewar political 
identities, as argued by Steele (2011), to wartime behavior of individuals, or to both. Again, 
the predominant hypothesis in the literature is that higher levels of violence yield more 
displacement, but the mechanisms by which these two are interrelated are not clear (Steele 
2009). In a recent research, Arjona (2010) argues that displacement is motivated mostly by 
the signal that armed groups send to civilians on their willingness to govern or otherwise 
cleanse them, once controlling the locality. Previous violence by the group in a locality 
could be a proxy for this type of signal. 
 
In the following subsection, I describe the data that will be used in the analyses. I will then 
present the results of the multivariate regression analyses. 
 
Data 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Incoming IDPs: For all 1,062 localities of Catalonia, I collected available data on the total 
number of internally displaced people that were living in a locality during different stages of 
the civil war, in particular in December 1936, in April 1937, and in August 1938.13 
 
                                                 
13 Source: Serrallonga (2004). These months/years are three out of the five for which he provides systematic 
data; he also collected data for December 1937 and December 1938. I choose to use the data for the three 
points of time for which he argues that his data is most reliable. These correspond to very different moments of 
the civil war in Catalonia, and I believe that can capture different dynamics regarding IDPs. This historian has 
triangulated data from different national, regional and local archives, which had censuses on refugee 
population at the level of the locality. The total number of cases for which he collected data on refugees are 
559 (December 1936), 642 (April 1937), and 678 (August 1938); the remaining localities had no IDPs. 
Outgoing people (1939 Displacement): As explained, it is almost impossible to get large-n 
data on displacement at the local level; getting perfectly accurate data implies making an 
assessment of every single individual who left a locality, and that is why historians have 
focused on a few counties and municipalities.14 Here I take a novel approach and I calculate 
a displacement estimate by using a series of indicators for which I have collected 
information at the local level (from primary and secondary historical sources). While this 
index is not optimal, it is the best possible estimate that can be calculated for a large number 
of cases. The indicators are the following: 
a) Official Census of the locality in 1936.15 
b) Official Census of the locality in 1940.16 
c) Number of people of the locality assassinated by the left between 1936 and 1939.17 
d) Number of people of the locality assassinated by the right between 1938 and 1942. 
This includes people that were assassinated after the celebration of judicial trials 
(most of which were in prison since 1939),18 and people that were assassinated 
without previous trials –at the moment of conquest of the locality by the rightist 
army.19 
e) Number of people from the locality that were in prison in 1940, and that did not get 
executed (that is, not included in d).20 
f) People from the locality that were killed in bombings between 1936 and 1939.21 
g) Combatants from the village that were killed in the battlefield.22 
                                                 
14 In total, I have been able to collect fine-grained data from historians for only 48 municipalities. This is a 
very small number (it represents 0.04% of the total of Catalonia). While I do not neglect these data, and I will 
use it for robustness checks, I am interested in obtaining another estimate of displacement that can allow me to 
have greater external validity. 
15 Source: Servei General d’Estadística (SGE).  
16 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).  
17 Sources: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989) 
18 Even if a lot of these assassinations took place after 1940, all the victims had already been imprisoned before 
that year, so they were not included in the censuses of their localities. 
19 Sources: Solé i Sabaté (2000), Gimeno (1989), Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1987).  
20 Sources: Sabaté (2002), Clara (1991), Ventura i Solé (1993). 
21 Sources: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1986), Gimeno (1989). These include mostly bombings by the 
Nationalists, but also deaths in Republican bombings that took place in areas close to the battlefield. 
22On this, I could collect data for 516 localities in 20 counties (Terra Alta, Priorat, Segarra, Cerdanya, Baix 
Penedès, Alt Penedès, Baix Camp, Bages, Berguedà, Noguera, Alt Camp, Garraf, Gironès, Pallars Jussà, Alt 
Empordà, Ripollès, Garrotxa, La Selva, Urgell, Baix Empordà, Pallars Sobirà). Sources: Pijiula (1993), 
Arnabat & Sabanés (2006), Oliva (1992, 1994, 1999), Blanch (1994), Bonjorn et al. (1991, 1995), Noguera 
(1989), Gimeno (1989), Garriga et al. (2007), Castillo (1991), and Sabaté (2002).  
h) People from the village that were killed as a consequence of war related accidents.23 
i) People from the locality that left during the 1936-38 period (that is, 1936 exile). 24 
 
If we subtract all the war-related causes from the figures of demographic change in a 
locality between 1936 and 1940, the result we get is the demographic change of a locality 
caused by the exodus of people that took place during the war, and quite particularly 
between 1938 and 1939.25 Hence, the variable 1939 Displacement is generated as follows:  
1) I calculate the number of people in the locality that were absent in 1940, as compared to 
1936: [(Census1940- Census1936)]. All positive cases (that is, all cases in which the 
population from 1940 was greater than the population in 1936) are coded as 0, 
indicating that there were no Absent people in the locality.26 The absolute value of the 
negative cases is the number of Absent people in the locality.  
2) From these total of Absent people in the locality, I subtract all the people that are absent 
due to reasons other than displacement, from the information I have been able to 
collect. The index is thus: 
Absent people - [Killed by Left + Killed by the Right +Imprisoned in 
1940+ Killed by Bombs+ Combatants killed+ War accidents deaths + 
1936 Displacement] 
 
A number of caveats: I am assuming that population growth in the localities was null 
between 1936 and 1940, and that all changes in population were basically a consequence of 
war-related factors.27 I am also assuming that population movements during that time were 
only related to the war, that there were no migration movements such as those observed 
during peacetime. I am also assuming that all the incoming people in the localities left at the 
                                                 
23 Sources: Same sources listed in footnote 17. 
24 Sources: Dòll-Petit (2003), Gaitx (2007). This data is very scarce, though. 
25 Even if exile also took place in 1936 and 1937, we can assume that most of the people would have come 
back in 1940, once the right was in power. In any case, I have included the cases for which I have data on 1936 
exile, in order not to count refugees from 1936 as refugees from 1939. Also, temporarily displaced people (for 
example, those that left their localities during the war to flee from bombings) would have come back to their 
homes after the end of the war. Thus, the index is not capturing 1936 refugees, or floating refugees. 
26 These cases either had a natural growth of the population, or had people incoming that stayed there. These 
cases only represent 20.18% of the sample. 
27 This assumption is coherent with figures showing that there was a total demographic stagnation in Spain 
during this period (INE). Also, natural demographic growth is usually null during civil war. 
end of the war, that is, they did not enter the 1940 censuses of these localities. As reported in 
Serrallonga (2004), only in very rare occasions the IDPs would stay in their hosting 
localities, as they were usually settled temporary housing, and they hardly integrated in the 
communities.  
 
I am able to estimate this index for 750 cases in my database (70.6% of Catalan 
municipalities of 1936).28 I use different variations of the index (for example, I also use the 
mere difference in the censuses, or the total of absent people in 1940), which lead to similar 
results.29 
 
Independent and Control Variables  
 
The different covariates included in the regressions, as explanatory or control variables, are 
the following: 
 
% Support left 1936: Percent support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections.30 
 
CNT Affiliation: % inhabitants affiliated to the CNT in a locality.31 
 
UGT Affiliation: % inhabitants affiliated to the UGT in a locality.32 
 
Latitude: Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50).33 
 
Longitude: Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50).34 
                                                 
28 Since I am concerned with the missing data and the representativity of the sample, I regress missing data in 
this variable on a large number of covariates. There does not seem to be any systematic factor accounting for 
inclusion in the sample.  
29 Note that using the mere difference of the censuses eliminates all the sources of bias that could come from 
the fact that there is data available on some variables (e.g. combatants killed, war accidents) in some localities 
and not in others. At the same time, it also avoids having an endogeneity problem in the regressions, which 
could be generated by the fact that there are variables that are included in the Exile index, and that are also 
included as explanatory variables in the regressions (e.g. executions). 
30 Source: Vilanova (2005). 
31 Source: CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970). 
32 Source: UGT (1931). 
33 Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC). 
 Altitude: Altitude of the municipality, in meters. 35 
 
Population: Official Census of the locality in 1936. 
 
% Single Men: Percent of total inhabitants of the municipality who were single men in 
1930.36  
 
% Literate: Percent of the total inhabitants of the municipality who were literate in 1930. 
This is a proxy for level of economic development of the locality.37 
 
Catholic Center: Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishopric in 1936; 0 
otherwise.38 
 
Competition: Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity). Using quadratic 
formula: 1-[(%Vote Left36 - %Vote Right/100)]2.39 
 
Volatility: It proxies the depth of the political cleavages; if patterns of support for the 
political blocs are stable, and therefore volatility is low, we can think that cleavages are 
deeper than if patterns of support for the blocs are unstable, and therefore volatility is high.40 
 
Executed by Left: Total number of people executed by the left in a locality in the 1936-39 
period.41 
 
Killed Priest: 1 if the priest was killed in the locality in the 1936-39 period, 0 if not.42 
                                                                                                                                                      
34 Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC). 
35 Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC). 
36 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 1930 census. This variable will not be included in the 
estimations for 1939 Displacement, because there is no theoretical justification for it. 
37 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 
38 Source: Conferencia Episcopal Española (CEE). 
39 Balcells (2010a). 
40 I measure this with electoral returns of both 1933 and 1936: 0 if % Support Left 1936-% Support Left 1933 
<=10%; 1 if %Support Left 1936-%Support Left 1933> 10%. Source: Vilanova (2005). 
41 Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989). 
 Bombings: I use different measures of strikes in a locality: bombings in a particular years 
(e.g. 1937, 1938, 1939), or bombings during the totality of the civil war.43 
 
Some of these variables will be included altogether in the models; others will be included 
separately, in order to test alternative hypotheses. Obviously, the variables will be testing 
different hypotheses depending on the dependent variable considered (i.e. IDPs or 1939 
Displacement). I will develop these hypotheses in the following subsection. 
 
Results 
 
Determinants of IDPs presence  
 
In this subsection, I explore the dependent variable IDPs, for three different years. The 
dependent variable in the analyses is a dummy with value 1 if the locality had IDPs in a 
particular month/year (December 1936, May 1937, August 1938) and 0 if not.44 
 
In Table I, we can see the results of a series of logit regressions on IDPs presence in 
December 1936. In M1, the main independent variable is Support Left 1936; this allows us 
to test the hypotheses that IDPs settle in locations with a greater presence of leftist 
sympathizers; M2 includes another prewar political variable in the covariates, Competition, 
which allows us to test for the hypothesis that prewar competition diminished the 
attractiveness in the locality as a refugee location. In M3, a measure of prewar volatility is 
added to the model with the competition variable; like before, if places with deeper 
cleavages are more risky in terms of safety of those arriving, people will be less attracted to 
go to these places. M4 and M5 incorporate variables endogenous to the war: M4 includes 
                                                                                                                                                      
42 Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989). 
43 Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1986). 
44 I use a dummy because it makes more sense to distinguish localities that had refugees from those that did not 
have refugees, than to look into total number of refugees in a locality, and variation in these numbers, as this 
will be more determined by the size of the locality. Regressions with total number of IDPs and with IDPs as % 
population of the locality are available upon request. 
executed by the left in the locality,45 and, M5 includes a more specific measure of 
repression, a dummy variable with value 1 if the locality had the priest executed during the 
war, and 0 otherwise. For 1938, I will incorporate a sixth model with the independent 
variable Bombings in 1937, in order to check if bombings during the previous year had a 
deterrent effect on IDP presence in a locality.46 
 
------------------- 
Table I about here 
------------------- 
 
Table I shows that leftist locations were more likely to receive IDPs in 1936. This is 
coherent with Steele’s (2009) finding that people move to places with a greater density of 
people with their political identity in order to become more invisible in front of the enemy’s 
threat. At the same time, the political variable Competition is significant and it takes a 
negative sign, indicating that places with greater balance of power between the left and the 
right were less likely to receive IDPs; these places turned out to be the most violent 
(Balcells, 2011a), and people might have been less reluctant to move there –anticipating this 
violence. It could also be that these divided communities had a particularly unfriendly 
climate, not cooperative enough to host refugees; or that refugees did not want to move 
there because they would not be as invisible to the enemy as in overwhelmingly leftist 
localities. Endogenous to the war variables are statistically insignificant; this makes sense as 
by December 1936, people could still not have information on wartime events, and thus 
their decisions regarding where to move could not possibly be affected by them. In all 
models, latitude takes a significant negative sign, indicating that southern locations were 
more likely to receive refugees: this seems to be due to geographical proximity as most of 
the refugees were entering Catalonia from the southwest. Altitude takes a positive sign, and 
this probably captures the fact that more mountainous localities where also safer 
destinations. Interestingly, % of Single Men in the locality has a negative impact on IDPs 
                                                 
45 Note that this is data on executions during the whole period. I could not collect these data disaggregated by 
year. 
46 I do not include data on previous bombings for 1936 and 1937, because there were no bombings in Catalonia 
in 1935 and 1936. 
presence; this can be also capturing the higher risk of violence in locations with a greater 
proportion of men in the age of being combatants and participate in violence (Muchembled, 
2010).47 % Literate in the locality has a positive impact, indicating that more developed 
locations were also more attractive to IDPs. 
 
In 1937 (Table II), we no longer find that leftist locations are more likely to receive IDPs; 
Competition is still negative and significant, though. At the same time, southern, western, 
and bigger (i.e. more populated) locations are significantly more likely to host IDPs this 
year. % Single Men and % Literate take the same signs and significance levels as before. 
Interestingly, in this table, we observe that there is a significant effect of a variable that is 
endogenous to the war: Priest Killed. Having had the priest killed reduces the likelihood of a 
locality to receive IDPs. The killing of the priest was a form of violence that became highly 
publicized and that could have clear deterrent effects. This variable was not significant in 
Table I (this makes sense, as the first wave of refugees was contemporary to the killings of 
priests, and thus could not be affected by them). In short, in this second year of the war, both 
prewar and wartime variables seem to be accounting for patterns of IDPs location. 
 
------------------- 
Table II about here 
------------------- 
 
Table III shows the results for IDP presence in 1938, which are overall consistent with Table 
II, but which display some interesting changes. On the one hand, while latitude is again 
negative, longitude takes a positive sign indicating that eastern locations were more likely to 
receive IDPs. That is probably as a consequence of the threat of a movement in the frontline 
due to the Battle of Ebro, which started in July 1938. On the other hand, prewar political 
variables lose significance in this table, but endogenous to the war variables become 
significant. Not only priest killed is very significant and negative (as it was in Table II), but 
also Executed by the Left is so. This confirms the deterrent effect of previous violent events 
                                                 
47 Another rationale for this finding could be that localities with a greater proportion of single men were also 
more emptied of man power due to forced conscription, and potentially with more empty spaces to be 
occupied by the refugees (i.e. industries having shut down, or similar). 
in a locality on IDPs presence. Consistent with this, Bombings in a locality in 1937 also 
have a negative effect on IDPs presence in 1938.48 
 
------------------- 
Table III about here 
------------------- 
 
I now briefly explore the consequences of IDPs presence on local dynamics of violence. As 
explained, the presence of leftist supporters having escaped rightist repression could have 
enhanced the perpetration of direct violence by armed groups. While the collaboration of the 
refugees was not as crucial as that of local civilians for the perpetration of violence (these 
were outsiders, after all),49 these IDPs probably brought information on what was happening 
on the other side of the frontline. In this way, they could have made local civilians more 
prone to help leftist militias, and promote violence against local right wingers. At the same 
time, people from hosting localities could just be shocked about the situation of the 
incoming refugees (Serrallonga, 2004: 175), and in this way develop increased hatred 
against their political enemies. Refugees were sometimes given voice in local newspapers, 
where they could explain what they had gone through with the Nationalists; this was a form 
of propaganda that enhanced collaboration with the refugees, but that could also increase 
local polarization and breed political hatreds. Finally, the presence of IDPs was undoubtedly 
stressing for communities undergoing the scarcity associated to the civil war; this could 
have generated private hatreds, and associated violence (Kalyvas, 2006). 
 
------------------- 
Table IV in here 
------------------- 
                                                 
48 In M6, I include Support Left36, as well, because this is variable has been found to be explanatory of 
bombings (Balcells, 2011b), and not including it would lead to an omitted variable bias. 
49 In Catalonia, refugees where mainly Spanish or Basque speaking, while the local population was Catalan 
speaking. So there was a clear division between local and outsiders. 
Table IV replicates the Negative Binomial models in Balcells (2011a), to which I add the 
1936 IDPs variable.50 The results indicate that IDPs presence in 1936 had a positive impact 
on leftist executions, confirming that leftist refugees incoming to Catalan localities could 
have altered the local dynamics and enhanced the perpetration of direct violence.51 
 
Determinants of Outgoing People  
 
In this subsection, I explore the dependent variable 1939 Displacement, which is a 
continuous variable (with minimum value 0, maximum value 2,094, and median 33.5). In 
M1, I include Support Left 1936 as the main independent variable in order to test the 
hypothesis that the amount of displacement was determined by the extent to which 
supporters of the rival populated the locality. In the Spanish case, the people that left in 
1938-1939 were fleeing from the Nationalist army, and we can thus hypothesize that they 
were mostly left-wingers. Trade union (CNT and UGT) affiliation and Catholic Center are 
also measuring the presence of leftist and rightist supporters, respectively. Competition is 
included in a second model in order to check for the alternative hypothesis that the local 
balance of power had an impact on displacement. Competition is a very robust variable 
explaining direct violence in civil war, and it could be that it was underlying displacement if 
this was to be used as a complementary strategy to cleanse localities from strong supporters 
of the enemy and change the local state of affairs. Volatility is added in M3 in order to check 
for the explanatory effect of the depth of the cleavages on displacement. Bulutgil (2011) 
explains that this is a key factor accounting for ethnic cleansing; it could be that this was 
also key in the explanation of what can be called ideological cleansing (Steele, 2011). M4 
includes executed left in order to test for the impact of direct violence on displacement. A lot 
of people left out of fear of retaliation, and thus we can think that more people would flee 
from places where the leftist militias had killed more civilians, where they would anticipate 
the right to be severe in the next period. Finally, M6 include bombings during the totality of 
                                                 
50 It only includes 1936 IDPs as an independent variable because the bulk of the executions took place between 
August and November 1936, and it would not make sense to include 1937 and 1938 IPDs as correlates of 
executions having take place earlier.   
51 I do not include % Single Men and % Literate in these models because these variables were not included in 
Balcells (2011). In any case, I have run the models with these variables and the results do not change. 
 
the war, in order to check for the impact of this form of indirect violence on the outflow of 
people from localities; bombing can be a signal of toughness of the armed group entering 
the territory, and thus can incentivize flight. In the case of Catalonia, the Republican 
government encouraged the evacuation of localities that had suffered from bombings or that 
were susceptible to experience them during the war. These floating refugees (fleeing from 
the bombs) could have easily become permanent refugees. 
 
------------------- 
Table V in here 
------------------- 
 
Table V displays the results of the OLS regressions. We can observe that Support Left 1936 
has a positive impact on displacement, quite intuitively: insofar as displacement in 1939 was 
the result of a threat of rightist conquest of the territory this should be larger in places with 
greater leftist support.52 CNT affiliation also has a very significant impact on rates of 
displacement, which implies that places with anarchist presence observed higher 
displacement; note that this is also consistent with the fear of retaliation hypotheses, as 
places with CNT affiliation were very violent, with no exceptions (Balcells 2010b). UGT 
affiliation is however not significant; and Catholic Center is not either. The geographical 
variables are not significant: altitude is negative in some models (indicating that 
displacement was greater in lower locations), but not in all of them. Competition, Volatility 
and Executed by the Left are not significant. Priest Killed has a very strong and significant 
effect, suggesting that killing the priest provoked a threat of retaliation and consequent 
flight. Total number of Bombings in a locality does not have a positive impact on 
displacement, as expected. Yet, if we run the models with different versions of the variable 
bombings (i.e. bombings disaggregated by year, total number of bombings, and total number 
of deaths in bombings) 1937 bombings in a locality shows to be highly significant (Table A1 
of the Appendix). This suggests that people that fled from early bombings more likely 
became permanently displaced . All these results are robust to the inclusion of county fixed 
                                                 
52 This contradicts the historical account provided by Gaitx (2006: 35), as he says that, for the 48 cases he 
studies, displacement is greater in places with lesser leftist support. 
effects, and also to the use of a differently specified dependent variable (e.g. difference in 
the censuses; absent people).53 
    
To summarize the empirical results, the analyses on the arrival of refugees into Catalan 
localities indicate that political variables are quite explanatory of the presence of IDPs in 
early stages of the war, i.e. in 1936, places with a greater support for the left, and places 
with a greater presence of the anarchist trade union (CNT) were more likely to host IDPs. 
Endogenous to the war variables are explanatory of the location of these refugees in 1937 
(i.e. locations having had the priest killed were less likely to receive refugees); and 
geographical variables (added to the previous variables) account for the location of refugees 
in later stages, i.e. in 1938. At the same time, the results indicate that presence of IPDs in a 
locality had a positive effect on leftist executions; hence, this suggests that localities were 
not impermeable to the newcomers, who had an incidence not only on cohabitation within 
the community, but also on the dynamics of violence affecting them. This is important as it 
suggests that cycles of displacement and violence have their seeds at the level of the 
community. Regarding outgoing population movements that affected all Catalan localities in 
1939, the results also indicate that both exogenous and endogenous to the war variables are 
powerful factors accounting for them. On the one hand, Support for the Left and CNT 
Affiliation, which are proxies for leftist supporters, have a positive impact on displacement; 
kn the other hand, executions of members of the clergy in a locality has a positive impact on 
displacement; this is probably due to the fact that this previous violence, which was highly 
visible and symbolic, generated a threat of retaliation at the local level, and pushed people to 
flee. And, at the same time, bombings by the right in 1937 are also statistically and 
substantively significant. It could be that bombings were signaling local populations that the 
incoming armed group had cleansing intentions and was not willing to rule the existing 
population (Arjona, 2010: 138), therefore incentivizing flight. But it could also be that these 
early bombings pushed people out of localities, and that these never came back after the end 
of the war. 
 
 
                                                 
53 These results are available upon request. 
Conclusions 
 
Displacement and violence are highly intertwined during civil war. Armed groups can use 
displacement in order to shape territories demographically (Bulutgil, 2009; Steele, 2011). 
Violence can generate displacement, displacement can generate violence (Hovil, 2008), and 
violence and displacement can simply be used as complementary forms of victimization 
(Kalyvas, 2006; Esteban, Morelli & Rohner, 2010).54 This paper has made an effort to 
untangle the relationship between violence and displacement during civil war using local 
level data from the Spanish civil war. Micro-level studies, which have been only recently 
used for the study of displacement (Engel &Ibañez, 2007; Steele, 2009, 2010), should be 
very useful to understand the relationship between these two phenomena. If we limit 
ourselves to the macro-level, we might be overlooking key aspects of these processes, and 
reaching flawed conclusions.55 
 
In the Spanish case, there has not been any theorizing over the displacement associated to 
the civil conflict which torn the country in the 1930s. Displacement has very often been 
considered a tragic consequence of fighting, and it has not been conceived as a weapon of 
war. The research has been limited to descriptive accounts of the refugee flows, or to the 
production of refugees’ life histories. In addition, the analysis of displacement at the micro-
level is extremely scarce.56 This paper constitutes a first attempt to systematically analyze 
patterns of arrival and departure of people from localities of a portion of the country. 
Regarding outgoing flows, the paper displays some relevant findings, which are consistent 
with recent research on displacement (e.g. Steele, 2010), and which leave room for further 
theorizing and research on the topic. Regarding incoming flows, the paper has taken 
advantage of data on IDPs presence in the Catalan rearguard territory in order to evaluate 
                                                 
54 For example, in a newspaper interview, a testimony of the Spanish civil war from Palencia explains: ‘They 
expelled (my mother and me) of the village, after executing my father. (…) He was killed for being a leftist’ 
(El Pais, 17 August 2011). He exemplifies how violence and displacement were used as complementary forms 
of victimization. 
55 As Steele (2009) explains, one of the most important flawed finding in large-n analyses of displacement is 
that higher levels of violence yield more displacement. 
56 Only a few historians have made some attempts to these (using small-n fine-grained data on localities), e.g. 
Pujol (2006), Gaitx (2006, 2007). 
 
different possible explanations for this. We have observed that a combination of political, 
geographical and wartime factors account for variation in IDPs presence across localities. 
While political variables are more salient in the first year of the war, the others gain 
relevance as the war goes by and the frontline advances –when the Nationalist threat 
becomes more visible and physically closer to rearguard localities.  
 
One of the findings in the paper is that that direct violence in t1 (in particular, executions of 
members of the clergy, by the left) is explanatory of local level displacement in t2. This is 
particularly relevant because it indicates that violence perpetrated against one’s enemies 
may have the counterproductive effect of promoting displacement of one’s own supporters if 
/when the control of the territory changes hands. This seems to be what happened in the 
Krajina region, in Croatia, where Serbs were expulsed largely as a reprisal on previous 
violence against Croats in the area. The implications of these findings are relevant to 
understand the motivations underlying victimization during conflict. In the case of 
Catalonia, the fact that displacement affected more intensively localities that were 
victimized by the left in the first stage of the war, and that they were later also victimized by 
the right, is likely to have generated important changes in their local state of affairs in favor 
of the right. We cannot test this conjecture because of the lack of electoral data from the 
immediate postwar period, due to the establishment of a dictatorship that lasted until 1977. 
Yet, the analysis of electoral continuity in municipalities of Catalonia (from 1936 to 1977) 
indicates that they did indeed experience a switch to the right (Balcells, 2010a). A tentative 
conclusion of this paper is thus that both violence and displacement are likely to be having 
political consequences in war-ravaged countries, and that is why armed groups used them 
strategically, in order to clean the territories politically.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
  Figure 1. IDPs in 1936              
 
 Figure 2. IDPs in 1937 
 
 Figure 3. IDPs in 1938 
Table I. Logit on IDPs Presence (1936) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
CNT Affiliation 0.063 0.068* 0.068* 0.064 0.061 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
UGT Affiliation 0.0076 0.012 0.012 0.0077 0.0074 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.072) (0.074) 
Latitude -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Longitude -0.00074 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Altitude (*1000) 0.79** 0.59* 0.59* 0.64* 0.69* 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
Population (*1000) 0.021 0.036 0.036 0.022 0.028 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.057) (0.077) (0.053) 
Catholic Center 0.22 0.045 0.045 -0.20 -0.030 
 (1.31) (1.38) (1.38) (1.60) (1.31) 
% Single Men -0.044* -0.063** -0.063** -0.056** -0.056** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
% Literate 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Support Left 36 0.014***     
 (0.0051)     
Competition  -1.14** -1.14**   
  (0.56) (0.57)   
Volatility   0.00080   
   (0.17)   
Executed by the Left    0.0027  
    (0.0086)  
Priest Killed     0.16 
     (0.16) 
Constant 91.0*** 86.3*** 86.3*** 84.5*** 84.9*** 
 (13.0) (12.9) (12.9) (12.8) (12.9) 
Observations 832 832 832 833 833 
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.153 0.153 0.148 0.149 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
Table II. Logit on IDPs presence (1937) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
CNT Affiliation 0.037 0.041 0.041 0.038 0.049 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
UGT Affiliation -0.093 -0.090 -0.089 -0.092 -0.085 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) 
Latitude -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Longitude -0.0052*** -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0054*** -0.0058*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Altitude (*1000) 0.047 0.055 0.054 0.064 0.082* 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.047) 
Population (*1000) 1.54*** 1.45*** 1.46*** 1.50*** 1.37*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) 
Catholic Center -0.28 -0.31 -0.32 -0.21 -0.29 
 (1.24) (1.29) (1.29) (1.40) (1.41) 
% Single Men -0.085*** -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.090*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
% Literate 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Support Left 36 0.0050     
 (0.0050)     
Competition  -1.40** -1.39**   
  (0.57) (0.57)   
Volatility   -0.062   
   (0.18)   
Executed by the Left    -0.0022  
    (0.0063)  
Priest Killed     -0.58*** 
     (0.18) 
Constant 104.1*** 104.4*** 104.6*** 101.9*** 103.1*** 
 (14.8) (14.8) (14.8) (14.6) (14.5) 
Observations 832 832 832 833 833 
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.224 0.225 0.218 0.227 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
 
Table III. Logit on IDPs presence (1938)  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
CNT Affiliation 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.051 0.0040 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.0051) 
UGT Affiliation -0.077 -0.075 -0.075 -0.069 -0.068 0.034 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.080) (0.032) 
Latitude -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.070 
 (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.083) 
Longitude 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.025*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028) 
Altitude (*1000) 0.0030 0.0031 0.0031 0.056* 0.0035 0.012*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.031) (0.0033) (0.0017) 
Population (*1000) 1.99*** 1.93*** 1.93*** 1.97*** 1.81*** 0.013** 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.0056) 
Catholic Center -1.26 -1.26 -1.25 -0.31 -1.07 1.95*** 
 (1.45) (1.46) (1.46) (1.39) (1.51) (0.38) 
% Single Men -0.059** -0.066** -0.066** -0.063** -0.063** -1.18 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (1.53) 
% Literate 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.059*** -0.058** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) 
Support Left 36 0.0031     0.060*** 
 (0.0051)     (0.011) 
Competition  -0.74 -0.75    
  (0.62) (0.62)    
Volatility   0.018    
   (0.18)    
Executed by the Left    -0.015*   
    (0.0086)   
Priest Killed     -0.57***  
     (0.18)  
Bombings 1937      -0.26* 
      (0.13) 
Constant 107.3*** 107.1*** 107.1*** 107.0*** 107.6*** 107.1*** 
 (12.2) (12.1) (12.1) (12.2) (12.1) (12.2) 
Observations 832 832 832 833 833 832 
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.159 0.153 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
Table IV. Impact of IDPs Presence on Executions by the left. Negative Binomial 
       
 M1 
Competition 1.296*** 
 (0.33) 
Frontline 0.290* 
 (0.15) 
Population (*1000) 0.075 
 (0.12) 
CNT Affiliation 0.112* 
 (0.06) 
UGT Affiliation 0.089 
 (0.09) 
Border -0.355** 
 (0.16) 
Sea -0.405*** 
 (0.14) 
Altitude -0.001*** 
 (0.00) 
Catholic center 2.169*** 
 (0.84) 
IDP 1936 0.404*** 
 (0.12) 
Constant 0.261 
 (0.42) 
LnAlpha 0.628*** 
Constant 0.09 
Observations 870 
Chi2 330.649 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table V. OLS on 1939 Displacement in Catalonia 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
CNT Affiliation 13.6*** 13.8*** 13.6*** 13.3*** 12.8*** 13.6*** 
 (3.92) (3.99) (3.95) (3.51) (3.75) (3.91) 
UGT Affiliation 0.0057 0.33 0.38 -1.43 -0.51 -0.0078 
 (7.91) (7.90) (7.78) (7.19) (7.69) (7.96) 
Latitude 0.029 0.13 0.099 0.11 0.12 0.030 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Longitude -0.24 -0.27* -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 -0.24 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Population (*1000) -0.11 -0.090 -0.066 -8.24 -0.092 -0.13 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (7.37) (0.25) (1.24) 
Altitude (*1000) -37.5 -52.8** -47.9* -48.7* -38.2 -37.5 
 (24.2) (24.2) (25.1) (24.8) (24.8) (23.8) 
Catholic Center -17.5 -23.9 -25.5 -292.0 -43.1 -18.4 
 (86.4) (81.7) (80.1) (292.7) (79.2) (113.0) 
Competition  47.2 49.0    
  (33.2) (32.9)    
Volatility   -20.4    
   (12.5)    
Support Left 36 1.04***     1.04*** 
 (0.29)     (0.28) 
Executed by the 
Left    2.35   
    (2.13)   
Priest Killed     54.7***  
     (11.3)  
Bombings Total      0.049 
      (3.87) 
Constant -2.26 -424.7 -300.4 -321.4 -417.2 -3.11 
 (831.1) (812.4) (826.5) (829.3) (825.0) (858.5) 
Observations 654 654 654 655 655 654 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. OLS on 1939 Displacement in Catalonia, with Disaggregated Bombings 
 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Support Left 36 0.91*** 1.15*** 1.12*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 
 (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) 
CNT Affiliation 13.5*** 13.2*** 13.4*** 13.5*** 13.2*** 
 (3.90) (3.69) (3.98) (3.90) (3.91) 
UGT Affiliation 0.48 3.59 2.38 1.99 1.73 
 (11.0) (11.4) (11.0) (11.0) (9.83) 
Latitude -0.018 0.036 0.019 0.0097 0.0086 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Longitude -0.27* -0.27* -0.26* -0.25* -0.25 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Population (*1000) -2.19** 2.14 -0.36 -1.50 -0.25 
 (0.88) (4.90) (0.60) (4.05) (0.29) 
% Literate 1.35** 1.43** 1.36** 1.35** 1.34** 
 (0.57) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.55) 
Altitude (*1000) -20.2 -33.5 -31.1 -29.5 -29.8 
 (22.9) (24.1) (24.9) (23.4) (25.2) 
Catholic Center -8.77 22.8 41.1 44.0 37.9 
 (156.9) (131.8) (115.5) (116.7) (116.1) 
1937 Bombings 53.4**     
 (21.6)     
1938 Bombings  -8.63    
  (17.3)    
1939 Bombings   5.70   
   (23.0)   
Total bombings    3.75  
    (11.9)  
Deaths Bombings (*1000)     2.46 
     (3.30) 
Constant 135.9 -124.9 -41.3 -0.67 2.28 
 (728.8) (781.1) (808.7) (756.9) (814.7) 
Observations 621 621 621 621 621 
R2 0.183 0.139 0.135 0.137 0.137 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
